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THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

Mortgages- 1 Suretyship Where Grantee of Mortgagor
Assumes Mortgage Debt.
Defendant's testator purchased certain land and gave his note for
a portion of the purchase price, executing at the same time a deed of
trust to secure the note. Subsequently he sold the land and the
grantee -"assumed" the mortgage debt. After this the mortgagee
without the consent of the mortgagor-defendant released a portion
of the land from the mortgage lien. Plaintiff as assignee of the
mortgagee brought an action to recover on the note. Defendant contended that when the grantee assumed the obligation, the grantee became the principal debtor, he (the mortgagor) his surety, and that
therefore the release of the land by the mortgagee released him from
liability. Held: The relation of principal and surety existed only between the mortgagor and grantee, and the mortgagee's rights were
not affected by the release of the property.1
It is generally held that where the purchaser of an equity of redemption promises the mortgagor to assume the mortgage debt, he
becomes personally liable to the mortgagor or his assignee for the
payment of the debt itself or for the deficiency after foreclosure. 2
But a purchase of the equity "subject to" the mortgage does not
amount to an assumption and the mortgagee has no personal action
against the grantee on the debt.3 In both cases, however, the mortgagor remains personally liable to the mortgagee.
Where the grantee "assumes" the obligation, all of the cases
found, except the principal case, hold that the grantee becomes the
principal debtor and the mortgagor his surety, not only as between
these two parties but as to the mortgagee as well.4 If the mortgagee
Brown v. Turner, 202 N. C. 227, 162 S. E. 608 (1932).
2In North Carolina, at one time, the result could be obtained only upon the
equitable theory of subrogation. Woodcock v. Bostic, 118 N. C. 822, 24
S. E. 362 (1896) (third-party beneficiary theory rejected, mortgagee's rights not
assignable); Baber v. Hanie, 163 N. C. 588, 80 S. E. 57 (1913) (assignee
protected, third-party beneficiary theory rejected). Since 1920, however, the
mortgagee may sue on a third-party beneficiary contract basis. Rector v.
Lyda, 180 N. C. 577, 105 S. E. 170 (1920); Parlier v. Miller, 186 N. C. 501,
119 S. E. 898 (1923) ; Coxe v. Dillard, 197 N. C. 344, 148 S. E. 545 (1929) ;
Sanders v. Griffin, 191 N. C. 447, 452, 132 S. E. 157 (1926) ; Keller v. Parrish,
196 N. C. 733, 147 S. E. 9 (1929) ; (1929) 8 N. C. L. REv. 85.
'Harvey v. Kinston Knitting Co., 197 N. C. 177, 148 S. E. 45 (1929) ; (1929)
8 N. C. L. REv. 85.
'The court in White v. Augello, 142 Misc. Rep. 233, 254 N. Y. Supp. 228
(1931), lays down the rule as follows: "When in a deed a grantee assumes and
agrees to pay, as a part of the consideration of the grant, a mortgage upon
the premises conveyed, the relationship of the mortgagor to the mortgagee is,
as between himself and the grantee, altered; the mortgagor ceases to be the
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learns of the transaction, a complete suretyship contract is then in
existence; and if the mortgagee and grantee deal with the property
so as to injure the mortgagor, without his consent, he is released to
the extent of his injury.5 Accordingly, it is held that where the
mortgagee releases all the property securing the debt the mortgagor
is entirely released. 6 In case he releases only a portion of the property, the mortgagor is entitled to have the mortgage credited in an
amount equal to'the value of the property released. 7 Also, a binding
extension of time by the mortgagee, since it prevents the mortgagor
from paying the debt and becoming immediately subrogated to the
rights of the mortgagee, releases the mortgagor.8 And where the
mortgagee releases the grantee from personal liability, agreeing to
look only to the security for payment, the mortgagor is released because he could not go against the grantee for any deficiency. 9
The court in the principal case places considerable weight upon
the fact that the mortgagee could proceed against the mortgagor on
principal obligor, and takes on the relationship of a surety, while a grantee
who has assumed and agreed to pay the mortgage becomes the principal
debtor." Meldola v. Furlong, 142 Misc. Rep. 562, 255 N. Y. Supp. 48 (1932) ;
Harden v. First Nat. Bank, 6 Pac. (2d) 1060 (Okla. 1932); Miss. Valley
Trust Co. v. Bussey, 49 F. (2d) 881 (C. C. A. 5th, 1931); Farmers & Merchants Bank v. Narvid, 259 Ill.
App. 554 (1931); Reeves v. Cordes, 108 N.
J.Eq. 469, 155 Atl. 547 (1931); Harris v. DePaulina, 40 Ohio App. 57, 178
N. E. 225 (1931).
'Meldola v. Furlong, Reeves v. Cordes, both supra note 4; Blumenthal v.
Serota 155 At. 40 (Me. 1931); Bingna v. Bell, 259 Ill. App. 361 (1930);
Harris v. Atchison, 183 Minn. 292, 236 N. W. 458 (1931) ; Grace v. Wilson,
139 Misc. Rep. 757, 250 N. Y. Supp. 212 (1931); In re Roth, 272 Fed. 516
(N. D. Ohio 1920); Insley v. Webb, 122 Wash. 98, 209 Pac. 1093 (1922);
Gilliam v. McLemore, 141 Miss. 253,-106 So. 99 (1925).
It is usually held, however, that mere negligence on the part of the creditor
resulting in the loss of the security will not release the surety. Fuller v.
Tomlinson Bros., 58 Iowa 111, 12 N. W. 127 (i882); Schroeppell v. Shaw,
3 N. Y. 446 (1849); Newcolnb v. Hale, 90 N. Y. 326, 43 Am. Rep. 173
(1882) ; Taylor v. Bridger, 185 N. C. 85, 116 S. E. 94 (1923).
' Crisman v. Lanterman, 149 Cal. 647, 87 Pac. 89, 117 Am. St. Rep. 167
(1906); Jordon v. Bullard, 145 'Ga. 890, 90 S. E. 41 (1916); Heidahl v.
Geiser Mfg. Co., 112 Minn. 319, 127 N. W. 1050, 140 Am. St. Rep. 493 (1910).
"In In re Hunter, 257 Pa. 32, 101 Atl. 79, 80 (1917), the court said: "Where
the mortgagor has parted with his title to the mortgaged premises, a release
of a part thereof by the mortgagee, without the knowledge or consent of the
mortgagor, will.discharge the latter from personal liability for any loss to
the mortgagee resulting from a deficiency in the proceeds of a subsequent
sale in foreclosure proceedings." Meigs v. Tunnicliffe, 214 Pa. 495, 63 AtI.
1019, 112 Am. St. Rep. 769 (1906); Norton v. Henry, 67 Vt. 308, 31 Atl.
787 (1895).
'Meldola v. Furlong, Miss. Valley Trust Co. v. Bussey, both supra note 4;
Bingna v. Bell, Blumenthal v. Serota, 'Harris v. Atchison, Grace v. Wilson,
all supra note 5.
"In re Roth, Insley v. Webb,. Gilliam v. McLemore, all supra note 5.
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the debt without first resorting to the security or the grantee. But
that is true in any surety contract. It in no way affects the creditor's
duty to retain the security for the mortgagor. If the surety pays he
has a right under the doctrine of.subrogation to have the debt and
the security assigned to him.' 0 If the security has been released the
assignment can only operate as an assignment of an unsecured debt
leaving the mortgagor dependent upon the general assets of the
grantee on an equal basis with other creditors. Such a result is
inconsistent with the mortgagor's contract and would, in a great
many cases, result in a total loss of the debt.
The result of the decision might be justified in fairness on the
ground that the mortgagor was not prejudiced. For the unreleased
portion of the land was sufficient to satisfy the obligation. It would
seem, however, that the rule announced would render the sale of an
equity of redemption extremely hazardous to the mortgagor and thus
menace this type of security transaction.

Winston-Salem, N. C.

DALLACE MCLENNAN.

Negligence-Statutory Measure of Damages For
Wrongful Death.
A twelve-year-old boy who contributed to his mother's support
by carrying papers was killed by what was at most ordinary negligence on the part of the defendant. In an action by the mother,
held, under the wrongful death statute of Georgia, the plaintiff may
recover the full value of the life of the child upon whom she was
dependent, or who contributed to her support.'
The Georgia statute provides for a recovery for the death of a
husband, wife, or parent in any event, and for the death of a child
if at least partial dependency is shown, 2 where the death is caused
"0In In re Roth, supra note 5, at 520, the court says: "The mortgagor, like
tny other surety called upon to make payment, is entitled to have surrendered
unimpaired all securities and remedies which the creditor holds, including in
this case both the mortgage and the personal obligation of the Lumber Company to pay the mortgagor's debt to the Supply Company." Schenectady Say.
Bank v. Ashton, 205 App. Div. 781, 200 N. Y. Supp. 245 (1923) ; Cooper v.

Jewett, 233 Fed. 618, (C. C. A. 8th, 1916); O'Neill v. Russell, 192 Wis.
141, 212 N. W. 278 (1927) ; Stevens v. First Nat. Bank, 117 Okla. 148, 245

Pac. 567 (1925).
In North Carolina it is held that where the surety pays the creditor, the security

must be assigned to a trustee or else the payment operates as a satisfaction and
in no other way can it be kept alive. Tiddy v. Harris, 101 N. C. 589, 8 S.E.

227 (1888) ; Peebles v. Gay, 115 N. C. 38, 20 S.E. 173 (1894).

' Michael v. Western & Atlantic R. Co., 165.S. E. 37 (Ga. 1932).
, See Central of Georgia. R. Co. v. Henson, 121 Ga. 462, 463, 49 S. E. 278
(1904) ("partial dependence upon the child's labor, accompanied by substantial

